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SYMPosIuM: RELIGION AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER LEE V.
WEISMAN

INTRODUCTION
Jonathan L. Entzn*

Controversy about public education has long been a staple of
American political discourse.' Disputes about religion have also
been intense.2 Not surprisingly, therefore, arguments about the
proper relationship between religion and the schools have had a
prominent place on the nation's agenda. Perhaps the most contentious aspect of this relationship has been the propriety of prayer in
public schools. Although officially mandated school prayers were
held to violate the Establishment Clause a generation ago,3 debate
on the subject has persisted. 4 Resolution of that debate has po-
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1. For a brief overview, see LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, POPULAR EDUCATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (1990).

2. For a recent historical account, see A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN
PUBLc LIFE (1985).
3. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schenipp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
4. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tentially significant ramifications, because the legal standard for
assessing the validity of school prayer may well affect the constitutionality of other programs that would incorporate religion into
public education, provide governmental assistance to religious
schools, or create voucher systems for elementary and secondary
school pupils.
For this reason, the Supreme Court's ruling in Lee v.
Weisman 5 was eagerly anticipated. Many observers predicted that a
strongly conservative Court would take the opportunity to reformulate Establishment Clause doctrine along lines significantly more
sympathetic to a closer connection between religion and the schools
than recent decisions had allowed. The case involved the constitutionality of the invocation and benediction offered at a public
school graduation in Providence, Rhode Island, in apparent disregard of the earlier Court decisions proscribing officially mandated
school prayers. The school authorities retained Charles J. Cooper, a
long-time critic of the school prayer decisions who had served as
assistant attorney general under President Reagan, to represent
them. Fueling expectations of impending doctrinal change, the Bush
administration as amicus curiae joined Cooper in urging the Court
not only to uphold the prayer but also to overrule Lemon v.
Kurtzman,6 the leading case in modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The Court's actual decision, which struck down the prayer and
declined to overrule Lemon, might therefore be viewed as anticlimactic. As the participants in this symposium make clear, however,
that interpretation would be mistaken. The decision is simply the
latest chapter in the long-running debate described above. What the
Court said in Weisman has important implications for the future of
public education.
To explore those implications, the Case Western Reserve Law
Review convened a two-day symposium on November 13-14, 1992.
Nearly a dozen prestigious legal scholars were joined by the lawyer
who represented the Weismans throughout their challenge to the
graduation prayer and by a prominent political scientist for a thorough review and assessment of the Supreme Court's decision.
Participants held a broad range of views on the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment, from strict separationist to staunch

5. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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accommodationist. Attitudes toward public schools ran a similar
gamut. Hence, almost everyone will find many things in this symposium with which to agree and many others with which to disagree.
In the first principal paper, Professor George W. Dent, Jr.
explores Weisman's implications for educational claims arising
under the Free Exercise Clause. Various aspects of public school
curricula have sparked religiously based objections.7 Professor Dent
contends that the Court's expansive conception of compulsion in
analyzing Deborah Weisman's Establishment Clause challenge to
the graduation prayer necessarily implies that much, if not all, that
takes place in public schools is inherently coercive. Accordingly,
pupils who find aspects of their curricula offensive to their religious beliefs should be able to invoke the reasoning of Weisman in
support of their efforts to obtain accommodation of their views
within the school setting. Dent explores the range of possible accommodations and urges that the Free Exercise Clause be interpreted generously in these situations.
Professor Dent's argument evokes divergent responses from
three commentators. Professor John Garvey finds merit in the argument and explores in greater detail four diffirent kinds of harm
that might be thought to arise from ekposing pupils to religiously
offensive ideas. Professor Garvey identifies two fundamental concerns, the possibility that children first might come to believe and
then to act in conformity with such ideas. He concludes by explaining why, for some parents, mere exposure to unwelcome ideas
is religiously objectionable even though children are not forced to
disavow their beliefs. Professors Joanne Brant and Stanley Ingber,
on the other hand, reject Professor Dent's analysis. For them, the
argument founders on the shoals of Employment Division v.
Smith,8 which severely circumscribed the scope of the Free Exercise Clause in challenges to generally applicable laws. Professor
Ingber further seeks to clarify the place of values in public education, concluding that some measure of compulsion is inherent in
schools but that accommodation of religious objectors to particular
aspects of the curriculum should only rarely be granted. Both these

7. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of School Conm'rs, 659 F. Supp. 939 (§.D. Ala.), rev'd,
827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 -(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988).
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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commentators also raise questions about the feasibility of maintaining effective public schools if religious objectors are too easily
accommodated with alternatives to regular instructional materials.
In the next principal paper, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen
argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Weisman did in fact
repudiate the Lemon test and replaced it with a new test based
upon the principle of coercion. Professor Paulsen, a staunch critic
of Lemon, reaches his counterintuitive conclusion through a close
reading of the various opinions in Weisman. He argues that a properly understood coercion standard, unlike the Lemon test, provides
a clear rule of decision for Establishment Clause disputes. Paulsen
then contrasts his version of the coercion test with others that have
been proposed and applies his test to a variety of fact patterns,
noting that his approach would alter the result of a number of
leading cases and provide a more satisfactory basis for decision in
others whose outcome would remain unchanged, including
Weisman.
Professor Paulsen's thesis also elicits a range of responses.
Professor Daniel Conkle rejects Paulsen's entire approach, offering
a spirited defense of Lemon's underlying concern for respecting
both religious and irreligious minorities. Professor Conkle further
challenges the purported clarity of the coercion test, arguing that it
does not offer the principled, "bright line" method for resolving
Establishment Clause claims that Paullsen and other advocates suggest. Professor Ira Lupu agrees with much of Conkle's critique, but
he emphasizes some implications of Paulsen's theory that would
make some establishment claims easier to sustain than supporters
of the coercion standard might expect. On the other hand, Professor Richard Myers generally supports Paulsen's analysis, though he
believes Weisman to have been wrongly decided. He suggests that
Professor Paulsen should more explicitly specify that parents rather
than public officials have ultimate authority to direct children's
education. Myers emphasizes the importance of mediating structures
such as families and invokes the principle of subsidiarity in support
of his position.
In the final principal paper, Dean Rodney K. Smith explores
the extent to which Weisman lends credence to arguments for a
broader right of conscience under the Establishment Clause. Drawing upon the various opinions in that case and several other recent
decisions as well as the writings of modem jurisprudential and
political theorists, he describes two contrasting approaches to the
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right of conscience: one based upon choice, the other upon obligation. He then criticizes the Court's analysis in Weisman.
Our final two commentators respond to both Dean Smith and
Professor Paulsen. Like Smith, Professor Edward Foley relies
heavily upon philosophical insights. Professor Foley applies John
Rawls's notion of "overlapping consensus" to the Establishment
Clause. Foley contends that establishment jurisprudence cannot be
neutral among denominations and that illiberal religions should not
enjoy constitutional protection. He also criticizes some implications
of Paulsen's coercion test, implications he finds sufficient to reject
that test out of hand.
Professor Ronald Kahn, a distinguished political scientist who
has written extensively on constitutional theory in general and the
Religion Clauses in particular, concludes this symposium issue by
urging a broader analytical framework. Professor Kahn maintains
that the Supreme Court considers both polity and rights values in
constitutional adjudication. Polity principles relate to structural and
institutional matters: whether decisions should be made at the local,
state, or national level; and whether those decisions should be
made by courts or by more electorally accountable officials. Rights
principles are perhaps more familiar to modem lawyers and involve
notions about the scope of individual liberty. Kahn argues that
polity and rights values play important complementary roles in
constitutional interpretation. He supports this position through a
close reading not only of Weisman but also of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,9 the landmark abortion decision handed down only five
days later.'" Accordingly, he criticizes both Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen for focusing too narrowly upon rights-based approaches to the Religion Clauses at the expense of vital polity
considerations.
As noted above, several of the principal papers and many of
the commentaries raised broader questions about the role of public
schools in American society. Those issues were considered more
directly in a free-wheeling, two-hour discussion involving all of the
symposium participants after each of the papers had been presented
and analyzed. Although that discussion cannot be reproduced here,
some of its main themes might assist the reader in sorting out the
arguments presented in this issue.

9. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
10. Weisman and Casey were five-to-four decisions. The same five justices comprised
the majority in both cases, a fact that Professor Kahn uses to buttress his analysis.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol 43:699

This plenary session began with an extended assessment of
voucher systems. Several speakers contended that some kind of
voucher scheme is constitutionally mandated in order to permit
parents to exercise meaningful control over the education of their
children. Placing primary responsibility with families serves, in this
view, as a check on the undue accumulation of governmental power over the lives of citizens. Although no one argued that the Constitution precludes adoption of any form of educational voucher
system, other speakers strongly challenged the argument that
vouchers must be provided. They also raised questions about how
such a scheme would work. For example, would a voucher cover
the full cost of a child's schooling each year? How could schools
be prevented from raising tuition to excessive levels to take advantage of the potential economic windfall that a voucher system
might provide?
These questions quickly led to other issues. The argument for
vouchers rests upon the desire to safeguard parental rights, but a
number of participants asked about possible conflicts between parent and child.11 In some circumstances, a child might be coerced
rather than nurtured by the family. One example that generated extensive discussion concerned a family in which parents refused to
allow their daughter to attend school because they sincerely believed, for religious reasons, that women should spend their lives
in the home and therefore do not need to be formally educated.
Some speakers suggested that no one, including parents, should
have exclusive control over children's lives. 12 Others doubted that
government could make sound decisions in this area and suggested
that the nation would be better off by trusting private actors despite their fallibility. From this perspective, mistaken decisions
about child welfare would be minimized and the societal value of
mediating institutions would be enhanced.
This discussion led in turn to exchanges about the proper
scope of regulation of private schools. For example, some speakers
expressed concern about including racist schools in any voucher

11. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that a child might wish to attend school over parents' religiously based
objections). Several participants mentioned this case during the discussion.
12. Some participants referred to recent decisions permitting girls to obtain abortions
with the approval of only one parent or, in some 'circumstances, without parental consent
but with a court order. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
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system because those schools might further divide American society. These speakers pointed to the resistance to desegregation after
Brown v. Board of Education1 3 and to more recent controversies
over racially discriminatory private schools.14 There were two responses to these concerns. One minimized the extent of the problem, suggesting that few such institutions exist in the contemporary
United States and that a voucher system would not provide incentives for additional ones to be established. The other acknowledged
that some racist schools would receive support under a voucher
system but that, to the extent that such schools taught religiously
based values, this was a necessary price to pay for taking the Free
Exercise Clause seriously.
The preceding example prompted more general consideration
of permissible governmental oversight of private schools. Topics
covered included teacher qualifications, curriculum content, and
national or state achievement standards. Spirited argument ensued
as participants debated the proper standard for regulation. Some
suggested a "compelling interest" test, which led to further differences over defining what constitutes a compelling governmental
interest. One alternative focused upon the likelihood that a person
would become a public charge, while others emphasized such factors as commitment to democratic values. This debate in turn
prompted consideration of questions about child autonomy, the justifications for compulsory school attendance, and the future of
public schools.
The final session reached no conclusions. Rather, the range of
conversation illustrated the intractability of the relationship between
religion and education. Lee v. Weisman did not resolve the controversy. This symposium demonstrates why the issues raised by that
case retain their vitality and helps us to understand those issues
more clearly. Despite their disagreements, the participants in the
program will take satisfaction if their efforts contribute to greater
public understanding of these vital national questions.

13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

